Existing research comparing open-list and closed-list PR electoral systems has highlighted the way in which ballot type affects candidates' electoral strategies. We depart from this literature by emphasizing that ballot type may also affect the relative success of different kinds of parties. When voters have strong opinions about an issue on which major parties are internally divided, open-list ballots give voters an opportunity to express their preference on that issue without having to support a "niche" party. We provide experimental evidence of this phenomenon from the UK, where we show in hypothetical European Parliament elections that using an open-list ballot would shift support from UKIP (the Eurosceptic party) to Eurosceptic candidates of the Conservative Party.
I. Introduction
Within electoral systems using proportional representation (PR), two types of ballots are in wide use: in closed-list systems, voters choose among parties, with the order in which candidates take seats being fixed within parties; in open-list systems, in contrast, voters choose among candidates, with the order in which candidates take seats determined by individual candidate vote totals. By giving voters influence over not just the number of seats each party wins but also which candidates from a given party win seats, open-list systems introduce a measure of intra-party competition among candidates. Political scientists have argued that this intra-party competition tends to reward candidates who have more local background and experience 1 and increases the incentive for elected politicians to deliver particularistic service to their voters 2 and even engage in corrupt activities. 3 While the literature helps us understand how different ballot types in PR systems affect legislative behavior, it offers fewer clues about how ballot type affects parties' relative electoral success. This omission is puzzling not just because political scientists have a strong interest in the consequences of electoral systems for party systems, but also because the partisan consequences of ballot type should be of first-order importance to the actors most responsible for choosing electoral systems -partisan politicians. Understanding these consequences may thus help us understand how specific features of electoral systems are chosen.
In this paper we argue that there are important situations in which ballot type is likely to affect party electoral strength in PR systems. With reference to a simple spatial model, we show that ballot type matters for party vote choice when candidates differentiate themselves from co-partisans under open lists, and when the degree of this differentiation differs across parties. We argue that this "differential differentiation" is especially likely to take place, and thus ballot type is especially likely to matter for party choice, when a salient issue intersects the dominant (left-right) dimension of political conflict. In such a situation, some parties mobilize on the cross-cutting issue, adopting a clear and unified position on the issue, while other parties are internally divided and either adopt centrist positions or fail to express a coherent position. For convenience, we follow Meguid (2005) , Adams et al. (2006) , Ezrow (2008) , and Wagner (Forthcoming) in using the term "niche parties" to describe parties that mobilize on cross-cutting issues; we refer to other parties as "mainstream" parties. Our main contention is that support for niche parties is likely to be weaker in an open-list system than in a closed-list system. Under a closed-list system, mainstream parties lose voters to niche parties because voters with strong opinions on a cross-cutting issue can only express those opinions by supporting a niche party that mobilizes on the issue. Under an open-list system, by contrast, candidates from mainstream parties can individually adopt clearer positions on the cross-cutting issue, such that voters can find a mainstream-party candidate who shares their views on the cross-cutting issue.
Put differently, voters who would be torn between a niche party and a mainstream party under closed lists can "have their cake and eat it" under open lists by voting for a particular candidate from a mainstream party who shares their position on the cross-cutting policy issue. To the extent that many voters find themselves in this position, niche parties attract more vote under closed lists than under open lists, while the reverse is true for mainstream parties.
We document this effect of ballot type on party vote choice in the context of a survey experiment focused on British elections for the European Parliament. In these elections (as in European Parliament elections elsewhere), the standard left-right dimension continues to organize political debate but there is a particularly salient additional dimension of conflict between pro-and anti-integration views (Hobolt, Spoon and Tilley, 2009; Hobolt and Wittrock, 2011; Ferrara and Weishaupt, 2004) . In Britain, this second dimension is highlighted by the rise in support for the "Eurosceptic" United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). UKIP is on average to the right of the Conservative Party on many issues, but primarily mobilizes on the question of Europe. In contrast, the mainstream parties in the UK, and particularly the Conservative Party, are internally divided on the issue of Britain's relationship with the EU. British elections for the European Parliament serve as a helpful test case for our theory because a significant number of center-right voters in the UK are attracted to the Conservatives' general policy positions (for example on economic issues) but are also sympathetic to UKIP's more clearly Eurosceptic stance on the question of European integration (Ford, Goodwin and Cutts, 2012) . In this context, we expect that many voters who would support UKIP in a European Parliament election under a closed-list contest would prefer to vote for a Eurosceptic Conservative candidate if given
the opportunity under open-list competition, as this candidate would be closer to them on both a general left-right policy dimension as well as the cross-cutting issue of European Duff, 2011) , and our analysis indicates that such a reform would tend to bolster mainstream parties at the expense of Eurosceptic parties. More broadly, ballot type could have partisan consequences in situations where environmental parties rise to prominence (as happened in Europe with the Greens in the 1980) or when antiimmigration parties attract support and mainstream parties are internally divided on the issue, as has occurred more recently. We recognize that the results of our survey depend heavily on our assumptions about the kind of candidates who would emerge in open-list competition, and we acknowledge that the findings are most directly applicable to the particular context of British MEP elections. Still, we contend that the theoretical insight applies more broadly and may help to predict what would happen under ballot type reform in a variety of contexts.
Methodologically, our study departs from most previous work on electoral systems by relying on a survey experiment rather than observational data. One could address the same question with a cross-country regression, but in European elections (and other types of elections, as discussed in Eggers (Forthcoming)) the countries that use different electoral systems typically differ in many other respects; this tends to make causal inferences depend heavily on modeling assumptions. 4 Our experiment removes much of the ambiguity of observational approaches by allowing us to observe whether similar voters facing the same basic choice behaved differently when shown a different type of ballot. While it is of course impossible to perfectly simulate the circumstances under which voters would cast ballots in a real election (let alone vary those circumstances in a fully realistic way), we believe the results provide unusual clarity about the likely effects of an electoral reform with broad relevance.
II. List type and party choice: theoretical expectations
In this section we highlight mechanisms through which changing between open-list PR and closed-list PR could affect party choice. We first introduce a simple spatial framework in which we represent open-list PR as a system in which candidates from the same party can adopt different positions; we then show that parties that allow such differentiation may benefit more from the adoption of an open-list system than parties that do not. We argue that open-list systems in fact encourage diverse positions but that parties differ in the extent to which they respond to this electoral incentive. Finally, we apply these insights to the case of EP elections in the United Kingdom.
A. The electoral consequences of differential differentiation
We focus on a spatial model of politics in which voters vote expressively, i.e. they choose the candidate or party whose platform is closest to their own ideal point. Figure 1 we assume that candidates from both parties adopt positions that are distinct from the party's perceived closed-list platform. Candidates L R and R L adopt positions more centrist than the party position under closed lists, but because both parties offer centrist candidates the 5 The same basic conclusions can be derived in a model with strategic voters (i.e. voters who cast votes in order to affect which candidates are elected, considering the likely votes of others); we discuss this approach in the Appendix and provide evidence that such strategic behavior may have been limited in our experiment. Finally, in the bottom panel of Figure 1 we assume that the parties differ in the extent to which individual candidates stake out differentiated positions. In this case, candidates from the L party differentiate while those from the R party do not. This moves the cut point to the right and convinces voters with ideal points in the shaded region to change their support from R to L.
The same arguments can of course be extended to multidimensional politics. To take the simplest multidimensional case, consider a situation in which there are two parties and two issues, and on each issue politicians can adopt just two possible positions, e.g. {Left,
Right} on the first dimension and {0,1} on the second dimension. 
Note: Under closed lists, we suppose that party L and party R occupy different positions on both dimensions (left panel). In the central panel, we suppose that both parties differentiate on the vertical dimension under open lists; voters with ideal points in the shaded region change their party vote, with ambiguous implications for overall party vote shares. In the right panel, we suppose that only party L differentiates on the vertical dimension, causing voters in the shaded region to change their party vote from R to L and leading to an increase in support for party L. We view the right panel as a fair representation of the (short-term) effects of introducing open-list ballots to a competition between a mainstream party (L) and a niche party (R).
B. The likelihood of differential differentiation
The foregoing analysis makes two simple points: parties face an electoral incentive to allow diverse positions in an open-list system, and voters' choice of parties will depend on the ballot type if some parties internally differentiate more than others. We now present some evidence that such differentiation actually happens under open-list elections, and that this differentiation is likely to differ across parties in a predictable way. We use this evidence to motivate our experimental design in the next section.
Research on open-list systems emphasizes candidates' efforts to differentiate themselves from their co-partisans in terms of effort (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2006; Bräuninger, Brunner and Däubler, 2012) , ability to deliver legislative 'pork' (Ames, 1995a,b; Crisp et al., 2004; Hallerberg and Marier, 2004; Grimmer, Messing and Westwood, 2012) , and other valence characteristics (Shugart, Valdini and Suominen, 2005; Tavits, 2009) . Less emphasis has been placed on the policy positions adopted by candidates, but the same logic certainly applies. 7 Intra-party competition in an open-list system clearly provides incentives to the party to allow such differentiation (as highlighted in the previous section). Candidates may also find that they can attract more preference votes by staking out a distinct position from their co-partisans. Anecdotally, MEP candidates from the same list do stake out different policy positions in countries using open-list ballots. In Denmark, for example, voters can visit a website that enables them to find which EP candidates are most compatible with their own positions; the candidates' stated positions on the key issues show clear diversity within parties. 8 More systematically, in analysis of roll-call votes in the European Parliament we find that party cohesion is lower in countries using an open-list system to elect their MEPs. (See regression results in Table   3 .) Why should we expect the level of differentiation to differ across parties? One important 7 For example, Samuels (1999, 492) argues that "Politicians in every party in candidate-centric electoral systems . . . can seek votes by either distributing pork or adopting policy positions."
8 The TV2 candidate test is available (as of 10 June, 2014) at http://politik.tv2.dk/kandidattest/kandidater. reason is that parties differ in the degree to which their members agree on salient issues, particularly when it comes to certain issues that cross-cut the main dimensions of political competition. For example, many mainstream parties in Europe are deeply divided on immigration, while anti-immigration parties are relatively unified (Geddes, 2003) . Given open-list competition, voters could choose among a diversity of viewpoints on immigration within these mainstream parties, while candidates from anti-immigration parties are likely to continue to present a unified anti-immigration viewpoint. 9 Of course, the logic outlined above suggests that all parties would have an incentive to offer candidates occupying a variety of policy positions; whatever the existing diversity of viewpoints within a party, that party would face an electoral incentive to recruit candidates whose positions would appeal to opposing parties' voters. It is clear, however, that there are counteracting incentives, and that these incentives vary across parties. For example, some parties may prefer to field a unified set of candidates in order to present a more cogent policy vision to the electorate; in some parties the leadership may have such strong policy preferences that they are unwilling to allow alternative positions for the sake of the party's overall electoral support. Many of the same arguments that are made to explain why parties do not converge to the median in electoral competition (Grofman, 2004) could thus be used to explain why some parties may not present a fully diversified set of candidates. Because these forces (e.g. the strength of elites' policy convictions, the importance of a given issue to a party's brand) may differ across parties, differentiation may also vary across parties.
Applying this logic to European politics, we should expect differential differentiation wherever the salience of European integration differs across parties. A clear example of this difference is between mainstream and Eurosceptic parties in European Parliament elections. Eurosceptic parties place high salience on the issue of European integration, and define themselves by their opposition to to the current design and operation of the EU. They compete against mainstream parties that originate from and mainly compete in national politics on a variety of other issues -such as the key economic and social 9 With reference to the right panel of Figure 2 , we see the mainstream party as L (able to adopt both positions on the second dimension) while the anti-immigrant party, R, is unable or unwilling to do so. policy questions that make up the contemporary left-right dimension of politics in Europe -and hence place less relative importance on the issue of European integration. These mainstream parties tend to have positions on Europe that are more vague, more variable over time, and more diverse within the party. This idea -that parties that put higher salience on the European question are more united on the issue -is confirmed by an expert survey (Bakker et al., 2012 ) that we analyse in Table 4 . The regression shows that parties viewing European integration as high-salience are significantly less likely to be internally conflicted on the issue. 10 Anecdotally, this relationship also emerges in attacks launched by Eurosceptic parties criticizing MEPs from mainstream parties for failing to vote in parliament according to a party line. 11 With reference to the right panel of Figure 2 , we see a mainstream party as the L party, with candidates adopting both pro-and anti-Europe positions on the second dimension, while a Eurosceptic party is like party R, with all of its candidates bound to an anti-Europe platform.
C. Corresponding expectations for European elections in Britain
Drawing on the previous analysis, what expectations do we have about the effect of introducing open-list ballots into British MEP elections? Under an open-list system, we expect candidates within the major parties to adopt a variety of positions on European integration. One reason for this is that all of the major parties have shown some degree of internal division over the question of European integration. These divisions have been clearest among Conservatives, with Conservative MPs and MEPs openly expressing Eurosceptic views that go well beyond the party line, 12 but elite dissent is also visible in the Labour Party 13 and, to a lesser extent, among the traditionally strongly pro-Europe Liberal Democrats. 14 Supporters of the major parties also express a variety of viewpoints toward European integration. We observe this in our own survey, as documented in Table   5 : although respondents supporting Labour, the Greens and the Liberal Democrats show a clear pro-Europe tendency, between one-quarter and one-third of respondents expressing a preference are Eurosceptic, while the reverse is true for the Conservatives. The existence of disagreement within a party does not of course mean that each viewpoint will be represented by a candidate on an open-list ballot. As discussed above, however, there is an electoral incentive in an open-list system to field candidates with distinct viewpoints who can appeal to different voters, and we expect that this logic would not be lost on party leaders and strategists. Another reason to expect a diversity of candidate positions within major parties is that recent elections (particularly the 2014 election) have highlighted pervasive voter scepticism toward Europe, resulting in strong showings for UKIP. The major parties may respond to this situation by becoming more Eurosceptic, but if competition
takes place under open-list PR we expect some candidates to respond more quickly than their party. Thus both existing disagreement and electoral incentives are likely to lead major-party candidates to adopt diverse views on Europe under open-list competition.
In line with the arguments presented above, we do not expect similar differentiation by UKIP candidates -at least not on the pro-vs. anti-Europe dimension. Euroscepticism is such a core element of UKIP identity that voters would have little idea what a pro-Europe UKIP MEP candidate stood for. In other words, we assume that when faced with open lists, we would observe differential differentiation between mainstream candidates and UKIP candidates. Because we will later refer to this assumption, we state it formally here: Given the analysis above, Assumption 1 implies the following hypothesis: Further drawing on the analysis above, Assumption 1 also implies that there would not be much net movement of votes among the mainstream parties:
Hypothesis 2: Assuming that the mainstream parties all differentiate on the European integration dimension, a change in ballot type should not result in substantial net exchanges of vote share among these parties.
In the next section we introduce the experiment we designed to test these hypotheses.
III. Experimental Design
Our experiment was embedded in a survey conducted by the research firm YouGov and fielded between June 26 and July 5, 2013. The survey was administered to a random sample of N = 9096 panelists who are, according to YouGov, representative of British adults in terms of age, gender, social class and newspaper consumption. For all analyses below, we use probability weights provided by YouGov to weight the survey to the national profile of all adults aged 18 or older. 15
For the core of the survey experiment, we asked subjects to vote in a hypothetical election for European Parliament. All subjects were shown a ballot listing three candidates from each of five parties (Conservative Party, Green Party, Labour Party, Liberal Democrats 15 The analysis below includes all respondents. However, when discarding all respondents who took under two seconds or over 100 seconds to answer any of the pre-or post-ballot questions (over 1000 respondents in all), which addressed attitudes toward Europe, party identification, and ease of using the ballot, the results are almost exactly the same. and UKIP). 16 Half of the subjects (chosen at random) were shown a closed-list ballot and asked to pick a party; the other half were shown an open-list ballot and asked to pick a candidate. As discussed above, our principal interest is in how parties' vote shares depended on ballot type.
As a general matter, ballot type could affect party vote choice only if voters have preferences not just between parties but also among the candidates within parties. Given that the candidates in our experiment are all fictional, any preferences that our survey respondents had among candidates could only come from information we provide. We thus had to think carefully about what information to provide. A first question involved how much information to provide about the candidates. Ideally, we would like to provide candidate information similar to what a British voter might acquire during the several weeks of an election campaign, when (depending on campaign behavior, which is likely to depend on ballot type) the voter may receive fliers from various candidates and parties, watch debates, read endorsements, etc.; unfortunately, such a large and nuanced amount of information could not realistically be communicated in the few seconds that survey respondents can spend learning about fictional candidates for our experiment. Ultimately, we decided to provide a subset of respondents with limited but clear information about the candidates's positions on Europe: in addition to a name (and thus gender) and party affiliation, each candidate was endorsed by a (fictional) pro-integration pressure group called "Britain in Europe", a (fictional) anti-integration pressure group called "Britain Out of Europe", or neither. Respondents received this information in two steps: first they were shown a screen explaining the endorsements and listing the endorsed candidates (as shown in Figure 3) ; on the next screen they were again shown the endorsements alongside the ballot as a kind of "voter guide" (as shown in Figure 4) .
A second question involved the nature of the endorsements we would assign to each 16 We chose a set of fifteen names (five female, ten male) from a web application that allowed us to generate random British-sounding names. The names were randomly permuted on each ballot, such that average party vote shares would not depend on voters' preferences over candidate names; we required, however, that one candidate for each party should be female, such that voters' preferences over candidate genders would not introduce noise in party vote choices. Figure 3 : Endorsement information provided to respondents before voting party's candidates. As discussed above, we assume that intraparty disagreements about European integration are likely in the major UK parties, but not in UKIP. Accordingly, for each of the non-UKIP parties (Green, Labour, Liberal Democrat, Conservative), we had one of the three candidates endorsed by the pro-Europe group, one endorsed by the anti-Europe group, and one not endorsed by either. For UKIP, we assigned an anti-Europe endorsement to all three candidates. It is therefore through the provision of endorsement information that we hard code our theoretical assumption about 'differentiated differentiation' into our empirical design. 17
In order to disentangle the effect of the ballot type from the effect of the information we provided to respondents, we designed the experiment as a two-by-two factorial design (highlighted in Table 1) in which ballot type (closed-or open-list) and endorsement information (provided or not provided) are independently randomly assigned. Thus roughly 17 One objection to our design might be that we do not allow for variation in the number of candidates 'endorsed' by pro-or anti-EU pressure groups. For example, it might be more realistic for the Liberal Democrats to have two pro-European candidates, rather than one. We acknowledge this, but feel that the effects of the ideological balance of a given list of candidates on party vote share is a nuance that we cannot fully examine in this design. This would, however, be a promising avenue for future work. one quarter of our respondents were given ballots like the one shown at the top of Figure   4 (treatment group C, in Table 1 ) and one quarter of our respondents were given ballots like the one shown at the bottom of Figure 4 (treatment group D, in Table 1 ). Another one-quarter (treatment group A) was given a closed-list ballot with no endorsement information and another quarter (treatment group B) was given an open-list ballot with no endorsement information. This design allows us to address two potential objections to the endorsement information we provided as part of our experiment. The first potential concern is about internal validity of the study: if we only showed the endorsement information to respondents who are also given an open-list ballot, then it would be impossible to disentangle the effect of the information we provide from the effect of the ballot itself. 18 The second potential concern relates to the external validity of the study: if all respondents are shown this endorsement information, and if this information is too divergent from the way in which voters typically think of the parties, then the effect of ballot type we detect may be very different from the effect that would be seen if the ballot type were actually changed. The factorial design allows us to address both concerns.
Clearly, because we can separately test the effects of the endorsement information and the ballot type we can address the internal validity concern. The design also allows us to address the external validity concern by testing whether the provision of information per se affects party vote choice among respondents who are given a closed-list ballot. As we show below, it did not, which suggests that our endorsements reflect positions on Europe that are not too dissimilar from what voters might expect to see from each party. 19
Another external validity objection could be raised, which is that the endorsement information was provided in a particularly heavy-handed way. Granted, such endorsements would never appear on an actual ballot paper; the information that voters receive about candidates would tend to be much more noisy and multi-dimensional. On the other hand, voters in a real election would have weeks to process the information to which they may be exposed, and they would be able to actively seek out the specific information that may be of use to them. (For example, "Which Labour candidate is most pro-integration?") It is also not unusual for voters facing complex ballots to be given voter guides by candidates and civil society groups. We view our information treatment as a compromise made necessary by the constraints of running a hypothetical election on survey respondents who have limited time to process new information.
Before we proceed to the results, we first check the balance of the respondents' covariate distributions across the four treatment groups. As expected from a randomized treatment allocation, the tests show no sign of imbalance. More precisely, the p-values calculated from a joint F (3, N − df ) test of no differences between the 22 covariate means, all measured pre-treatment, across the four treatment conditions follow the expected uniform distribution over the [0, 1]-interval. Figure 12 in the Appendix plots the empirical distribution of the p-values from these balance tests against the theoretically expected uniform distribution: since all p-values are above the 45 degree line, we can safely assume that 19 It is of course possible that the endorsement information changes voters' understandings of parties' positions but does not change overall party votes shares in the closed-list condition; for example, the information that there are pro-and anti-integration Liberal Democrats might simultaneously make the party more attractive (because more moderate than voters thought) and less attractive (because more incoherent than voters thought), with no net effect. randomization was successful. Table 6 in the Appendix shows the underlying covariate means and corresponding F -tests across the four treatment conditions.
IV. Results

A. Main results: endorsements, ballot type and party vote shares
To evaluate the effect of ballot type on party vote shares, we separately compare the party vote shares for the five main parties under the four treatment conditions indicated in Table   1 ; in particular, we run a separate OLS regression for each party in which the dependent variable is 1 if the respondent chose this party (otherwise 0) and the regressors are a binary indicator for Open List, a binary indicator for Information About Candidates, an
Interaction of the two indicators, and a constant. Table 7 presents the regression results. Note first that the constant term in each regression measures the proportion of respondents in treatment group A (closed-list ballot and no endorsements) who selected a given party (12% for the Greens, 30% for Labour, 10% for the Liberal Democrats, 24% for the Conservatives and 25% for UKIP). These proportions differ somewhat from the results of the 2014 election, 20 but they are quite close to the average of six polls that took place in 2013 (the year we ran our survey). 21 This highlights the representativeness of our sample and suggests that our hypothetical ballot accesses the same preferences as more standard vote intention questions.
The regressions indicate that neither the ballot type nor the endorsement information has an independent effect on vote choice: in none of the five regressions does either coefficient approach statistical significance. The insignificant coefficients on "Open-list" indicate that among respondents who were not shown any endorsement information about the candidates (treatment groups A and B), ballot type did not affect party vote choice on average.
This makes sense, given that respondents have no reason to prefer individual fictional candidates unless they know something about them. The insignificant coefficients on "With information" similarly indicate that among respondents who were shown closed-list ballots (treatment groups A and C), the provision of endorsement information does not affect party vote choice on average. This is reassuring evidence that the endorsement information we provided roughly comports with voters' perceptions of the parties and thus that our evidence may be informative about what would happen if open lists were introduced.
We now turn to the interaction term in the regressions in Table 7 , which indicates how the effect of ballot type differs between the informed group (treatment groups C and D) and the uninformed group (treatment groups A and B). 22 The interaction term is significant only for the Conservatives (who gain from open lists) and UKIP (who lose). This finding is consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2 above, which predicted that UKIP would lose support because of its unified position on European integration while the mainstream parties would not see much net exchange of votes. The Conservatives appear to benefit at UKIP's expense because of the parties' relative proximity on other issues; we will further examine this interpretation below. As can be expected from a randomized experiment, these Democrats, 24% for the Conservatives and 27.5% for UKIP. 21 The average of these six polls for each party is as follows: Greens, 5%; Labour, 32%; Liberal Democrats, 11%; Conservatives, 23%; UKIP, 23% (UK Polling Report, 2014). The lower result for the Greens in other 2013 surveys may be due to the fact that other small parties were excluded from our survey.
22 Given the absence of an effect for the uninformed group, this approximates the effect of changing the ballot type conditional on endorsement information being provided. results do not depend at all on whether we include a large set of respondent characteristics (respondent's attitude toward Europe, socio-demographic characteristics, and previous vote choice) in the regression. Figure 5 presents the same results graphically. Based on the findings above, we focus on the comparison of vote choice in treatment groups C and D (i.e. those who were given the endorsement information). 23 As seen in Figure 5 , the Conservative Party gains about 6 percentage points (a 26% increase in vote share, with 95% confidence interval [.12, .40]) from a move to open-list competition. The mirror image of this shift is a corresponding decrease in vote shares for UKIP, which loses about 7 percentage points (a 26% decrease in vote share, with 95% confidence interval [-.38, -.14] ). Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we find no sizeable or significant effect for any of the other parties, i.e. Labour, Liberal Democrats, and the Greens. Figure 13 in the appendix depicts party vote shares in all four treatment conditions.
B. Subsample analysis: interactions with respondents' party identification and stance on Europe
Our theoretical analysis made clear that we do not expect the effect of ballot type to be uniform across all voters. Specifically, we expect expressive voters with preferences close to a mainstream party on one dimension, but close to the niche party on a cross- 
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Open list tion) while subsetting the analysis by respondents' party identification. The resulting 25 estimates are presented in Table 8 and compactly visualized in Figure 6 .
The results for the different party identifiers give rise to a more detailed picture. Having established that most of the action takes place among Conservative and UKIP voters, we now turn our focus on the interaction of ballot type and respondents' position on Europe for these two parties. Respondents' stance on European integration is measured using an 11-point question ranging from "strongly opposed to British membership of the EU" (0) to "strongly support further British integration in the EU" (10). 25 For the analysis, we recode this item in three binary indicators: Anti EU for values between 0-3, Neutral for values between 4-6, and Pro EU for values between 7-10. Figure 7 displays the results 24 The magnitude of the effect of ballot type on propensity to vote Conservative is similar for Conservative and UKIP identifiers, but the number of Conservative identifiers is much larger (33% vs. 12%). 25 This question was administered prior to assigning respondents to the different treatment conditions. To summarize, the subsample analysis confirms that the shift in vote shares from UKIP to the Conservative Party comes from Euroskeptic voters who identify with either the Conservatives or UKIP. This offers further support for our argument about policy differentiation and ballot type.
V. Conclusion
Which parties win and lose when a closed-list PR system (such as the one Britain uses to elect its MEPs) is changed to an open-list system? We used a simple framework to show how ballot type can affect voters' choices, and hence election outcomes, through a process of "differential differentiation" -the adoption by some parties, under open-list elections, of a variety of policy positions (especially on a secondary issue) in a way that tends to undermine the support of parties that are more unified. We carried out a survey experiment that showed how voters might respond to differential differentiation in the case of U.K. elections to the European Parliament, where we argued that the major parties would field candidates representing a diversity of viewpoints on European integration while UKIP would remain solidly Eurosceptic. We conclude that, just as UKIP lost support from
the adoption of open lists in our experiment, niche parties (who mobilize on an issue that It should be noted that our experiment can only really test part of the predicted effects of a move from closed-list to open-list PR. That is, our results suggest that, conditional on there being differential differentiation among the parties, the party that differentiates less loses support (and the ideologically proximate party that differentiates more wins support).
Our experiment could not, of course, test whether the parties would actually respond in this way to the introduction of open-list elections. While our experiment highlights the electoral advantages of fielding a set of candidates with diverse views, those advantages are offset by the possible damage such diversity might inflict on a party's brand McCubbins, 1993, 2005) . Introducing a heterogeneous list of candidates may entail greater costs to the party brand than the benefits gained by poaching the votes of undifferentiated parties. We hope that future work can provide a more complete picture of how much the introduction of open lists induces policy differentiation among candidates and how this differentiation is likely to differ across parties; such work is necessary to get a clearer picture of who wins and loses in a setting where party strategy and voter behavior jointly respond to a change in ballot type.
One of the contributions of this paper is to broaden the range of issues that are relevant for intra-party competition in open-list system, and to show how these issues affect inter-party competition. Previous work has focused on "valence" issues such as experience, localness, and ability to distribute pork, all of which are thought to be important in determining which candidates win seats. We have emphasized the possibility that candidates might compete on policy as well. Although differences in valence could affect relative party success in an open-list system (Tavits, 2009) , we suspect that differences in the extent to which candidates on a single list adopt distinct policy positions (or "differential differentiation") will in many circumstances be a more influential determinant of party electoral strength, given that parties differ in their ability or willingness to allow for disagreement on salient issues. Note: The only significant differences in party vote share across treatment conditions are for the Conservatives and UKIP between the open-list with information condition, and the other conditions. This indicates that neither the provision of information nor open lists on their own affect party vote choice. 
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VIII. Strategic voting, ballot type, and party choice in theory and practice
The theoretical discussion in the paper is based on expressive voters, but similar points about the possible effect of ballot type on party vote choice can be made based on strategic voting. A strategic voter decides how to vote based on the policy outcomes she expects from each possible vote she could cast. If ballot type is to make any difference to a strategic voter's vote choice, it must be that the voter believes that individual MEPs have a non-negligible effect on policy outcomes, whether because MEPs do not simply follow the party line or because MEPs help to create the party line. If that is the case, then ballot type can affect a strategic voter's party vote when it changes the "pivotal event" (Myatt, 2007) associated with the highest expected utility differential for that voter. Consider, for example, a strategic Eurosceptic voter whose utility is simply increasing in the number of Eurosceptic MEPs elected. Under closed lists, this voter must calculate the various ways in which her vote could increase the number of Eurosceptic MEPs elected; this depends on the number of seats each party is likely to win and whether the marginal MEP for each party is a Eurosceptic. Under open lists, the voter faces the same set of pivotal events (except that the identity of the marginal MP for each party depends not just on the party's vote share but on other voters' votes) plus an additional set of pivotal events in which her vote could determine which member of each party wins the party's marginal seat. One way in which a change in ballot type could affect this voter's party choice is if (under open lists) the probability of casting a decisive vote between a Eurosceptic candidate and a non-Eurosceptic candidate within a non-UKIP party is higher than the probability of casting a decisive vote between a UKIP candidate and a non-Eurosceptic candidate of another party, whereas under closed lists the latter probability was higher than the probability of casting a decisive vote between a Eurosceptic candidate of a non-UKIP party and a non-Eurosceptic candidate of any other non-UKIP party. If the voter's utility function also took into account the MEP's party, and if Eurosceptic voters tended to favor the Conservatives over other parties, we would expect strategic Eurosceptic voters to be particularly drawn to casting the decisive vote between a Eurosceptic and a non-Eurosceptic Conservative candidate under open lists. Thus our finding of greater support for the Conservatives (and less for UKIP) as we move from closed-list to open-list ballots is consistent with strategic voting rather than expressive voting.
If there indeed are strategic Eurosceptic voters who favor the Conservatives to other major parties, it suggests that we might see an effect of ballot order in the closed list component of our experiment. In particular, under closed lists we might expect Eurosceptic voters to be more likely to vote Conservative when a Eurosceptic candidate is nearer to the top of the Conservative party list. That is, a right-leaning Eurosceptic voter might focus on two pivotal events: the one in which she casts the decisive vote between a UKIP candidate and a non-Eurosceptic candidate from another party, and the one in which she casts the decisive vote between a Eurosceptic Conservative candidate and a non-Eurosceptic candidate from another major party. Note that the probability of the second pivotal event depends crucially on the order in which the Conservative candidates are listed. A sophisticated voter would recognize that the Conservatives are likely to win either 0 or 1 seat in this (hypothetical) election, very unlikely to win 2 seats, and extremely unlikely to win all 3 seats. Thus the pivotal event of electing a Eurosceptic Conservative is most likely when the Eurosceptic Conservative candidate is at the top of the party list, less likely when that candidate is in the middle of the list, and essentially impossible if the candidate is at the bottom of the list. It follows that such a voter would be more likely to vote Conservative under closed lists when the Eurosceptic Conservative is higher on the party list. Note: Separate OLS regressions for models (1)-(6). Regression coefficients shown with corresponding tstatistic in parentheses. All regressions are weighted using YouGov's survey weights. The subsample used for this analysis focuses on Eurosceptic voters under the closed-list with information treatment condition. Eurosceptic 1st = 1 indicates that the first candidate on the Conservative party list is endorsed by "Britain Out of Europe", Eurosceptic 2nd = 1 that the second candidate on the party list is a Eurosceptic, and Eurosceptic 1st or 2nd = 1 that either of the first two candidates is Eurosceptic.
The simplest explanation for this non-finding is that voters in our experiment tended to act in an expressive way rather than carefully considering likely election outcomes. It is also possible that they do consider election outcomes but their expectations about the likely outcomes are so diffuse that we fail to see effects in the aggregate, whether because they tend not to agree about likely voting behavior or they do not understand how voting behavior maps to electoral outcomes. Perhaps there would be more strategic behavior in a real election in which voters are exposed to messages by strategic activists and campaign officials.
